PIC

Cp text-The United States federal government should ban the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles because it violates the domestic ban on assassinations
Heinz Klug, Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School, Wisconsin Law Review, ‘03, Lexis
While Predator UAVs have now been deployed in numerous attacks, **63** there are three separate incidents that provide the particular context in which to explore the relevant legal issues. The first case, near Kandahar, Afghanistan, occurred in late September or October 2001, and involved the targeting of jeeps ferrying Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar. U.S. Central Command's senior operational lawyer Navy Captain Shelly Young advised against firing the missile at the jeeps. __64__ Captain Young's decision to advise against the strike is reported to have been based on concern that killing Omar would violate the Geneva Convention's prohibition on assassinations and on the grounds that the Predator UAV had not been vetted by legal staff for use as a weapon. In this case the jeeps escaped by the time the UAV operators were given the go ahead, raising questions about the role of lawyers in military operations, **65** a function that has expanded dramatically since a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum in the 1980s "required that all operational plans, contingency plans and rules of engagement be reviewed by lawyers for compliance with the international Law of War and with U.S. domestic law." **66** Despite assurances that military lawyers are "never in a position to "stop' any attack," and it is not even certain what role Young's advice played in General Tommy Franks' decision to hold fire, **67** it was later revealed that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld expressed great irritation at the fact that the military had hesitated and thus failed to get Omar when they thought they had him in their sights. **68** The third incident occurred on November 3, 2002, when a CIA Predator drone flying near Marib, Yemen, fired a missile at a car killing six men. **76** The target of the attack was reported to be Ali Qaed Sunuan al-Harathi, described variously as a bin Laden bodyguard, **77** one of bin Laden's key lieutenants in Yemen, **78** a high ranking militant, suspected of involvement in the plot to bomb the destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden in October 2000, **79** and an individual wanted for questioning by law [*379] enforcement officials investigating the Cole bombing. **80** Of the five others in the car, one is thought to have been a U.S. citizen, Ahmed Hijazi (who might have been one of the two alleged members of the Buffalo, New York, al Qaeda cell - Kamal Derwish or Jaber Elbaneh - believed to be at large in Yemen), while the identities of the other four have remained unknown but with them being described variously as henchmen, important terrorists, al Qaeda suspects, or al Qaeda operatives. **81** The strike in this case was never officially acknowledged by the CIA, although senior Bush administration officials claimed credit off the record and noted that President Bush has "authorised the CIA to kill around two dozen alleged terrorists on a secret hit list and any others it considers to be "enemy combatants.'" **82** The New York Times quoted anonymous U.S. officials saying that "approval of the list did not abolish a long-standing presidential executive order banning assassinations, as the terrorists are defined as "enemy combatants' and thus legal targets." **83**The designation, by an attacker, of individuals as "enemy combatants" does not however resolve the question of whether they are legally considered to be legitimate targets of military action. Both the Geneva Conventions **84** and U.S. domestic law __85__ explicitly prohibit extrajudicial killings, which are generally defined as the arbitrary deprivation of life "without a judgment by a competent and independent court or any recourse [*380] to processes of law," while the laws of war have historically made a distinction between potential and actual combatants. Even members of the armed forces, "do not become "actual combatants' for the purposes of the application of the laws of war unless there are hostilities of a certain intensity." **86** Although the laws of war have evolved to give ever greater legal protection to non-combatants, including combatants who are hors de combat, **87** Protocol I of 1977, which extends the definition of combatant to irregular forces (and to which the United States is not a party), nevertheless "affords no protection for terrorists." **88** It is in this context that concern has been expressed over the use of the UAVs, particularly in killing specific individuals in countries where there is no war. Vienna Colucci of the U.S. section of Amnesty International has argued, "if the suspects did not pose an immediate threat, and were deliberately killed in lieu of arrest, then Amnesty International would consider these killings to be extra-judicial executions, which are prohibited in all circumstances by international human rights law." 89 Describing the use of the UAVs as the "beginning of robotic warfare," Clifford Beal, editor of Jane's Defence Weekly, told the Reuters news agency that "there is underlying tension in the military about using it. The CIA does not have any qualms," 90 while the Swedish Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, told the Swedish news agency TT that "if the USA is behind this with Yemen's consent, it is nevertheless a summary execution that violates human rights. If the USA has conducted the attack without Yemen's permission it is even worse. Then it is a question of unauthorised use of force." 9

CIL DA

1. Incorporating CIL would invalidate the Nuclear Deal
Wable, J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 2008 (Kesav Murthy Wable, B.A., Haverford College (2002); J.D., Brooklyn Law School (expected 2008) “The U.S.-India Strategic Nuclear Partnership: A Debilitating Blow To The Non-Proliferation Regime,” 33 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 719, Lexis)
The U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative is essentially being undertaken without the blessing of the multilateral non-proliferation regime. What this means for the future of the regime can be ascertained through an analysis of Thomas M. Franck's theory of legitimacy and traditional models. n80 On the one hand, the initiative can be construed as a defection by the United States from the principles of the non-proliferation regime that ultimately derogates from the regime's capacity to obligate. n81 On the other hand, if the United States argues that this initiative is consistent with the goals of the non-proliferation regime (which it fervently has) n82 then the regime's legitimacy is nevertheless dealt a blow, this time by an undermining of its determinacy. n83 In other words, this would signal to the remaining states, especially those with considerable access to nuclear technologies, that reaching similar arrangements with non-NPT signatories would be acceptable behavior under the non-proliferation regime. In either case, the consequences are the same: states will be induced into behavior that threatens to increase the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. In order to proceed with this line of analysis, it is first necessary to establish that the non-proliferation regime embodies rules that govern state practice. It is a basic tenet of international law that a practice generally followed by states out of a sense of legal obligation gives rise to customary international law, which is binding on all states. n84 The term "practice" contemplates diplomatic acts, statements of policy, or even inaction of a state in the face of outside-state behavior that may affect its legal rights. n85 Therefore, the signing of international instruments itself can contribute to the crystallization of customary rules of international law. n86 [*738] In this vein, it is a testament to the existence of a customary law that 187 countries have ratified the NPT, making it the most widely accepted arms limiting or disarmament instrument in history. n87 Second, the existence of nuclear weapons-free zones, test bans, and other non-proliferation treaties, virtually all of which are codified in multilateral instruments, further buttresses the proposition that there exists an obligation to pursue non-proliferation methods consistent with the existing regime's practice under customary international law. n88 Third, the legitimacy of the regime is underscored when one examines the nuclear weapons control issue as a classic example of the prisoner's dilemma ("PD"). In this game theory model, the players are confronted with a collective action problem in which no player can be sure what course of action the other players will take and unilateral defection from the collective purpose can produce the greatest individual benefits. Arms control presents precisely such a predicament. n89 However, despite the strong pull of non-compliance in this context, 182 non-nuclear weapons states have signed the NPT and those with nuclear programs have submitted to full-scope safeguards on all their nuclear energy facilities. n90 This fact alone illustrates the degree of legitimacy the non-proliferation regime has attained notwithstanding its aforementioned shortcomings. When states forgo short-term strategic advantages while paying deference to long-term "communitarian interests," it evinces a collective desire to see the regime's rules reinforced. n91 A corollary of this principle is that a defecting state will be regarded a threat to the long-term interests of other states. n92

2. Obama marks a turning point in US-India relations--the civilian nuclear deal is the litmus test of cooperation
Curtis, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, 2009 (Lisa Curtis is a Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, focusing on analyzing America's economic, security, and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, “Building a Strategic Partnership: U.S.-India Relations in the Wake of Mumbai,” Testimony before Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives, 2-26, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Asiaandthepacific/tst022609a.cfm)
The U.S.-India relationship has improved dramatically over the last decade. Relations started to improve in the early 1990s following India's economic reforms, but lingering mutual suspicion from the Cold War era, India-Pakistan tensions (which resulted in three major military crises between 1990 and 2002), and the 1998 nuclear tests stalled genuine strategic engagement. Former President Clinton's famous 2000 visit to India created mutual good feelings and was a catalyst for improved relations, but it wasn't until President George W. Bush entered office with a broader vision for the relationship that we witnessed a substantive shift in the ties between India and the United States. The centerpiece of this paradigm shift in relations was the completion of the civil nuclear deal last fall, an historic agreement that has removed a major irritant in U.S.-India relations. During the Bush Administration, U.S. officials broke the habit of viewing India solely through the India-Pakistan lens. Washington developed a greater appreciation for the Indian democratic miracle and viewed our shared democratic principles as the bedrock for a broader strategic partnership. Washington began to view India's growth in power as a positive development for the balance of power in Asia. India is now broadening its engagement throughout Asia through closer relations and trade links with China, strengthened political and economic ties to the Southeast Asian states, and a budding security partnership with fellow democracy Japan. India's increased economic and political involvement throughout the Asian continent will help to ensure that one country does not dominate the continent, and will encourage stability in a region that accounts for a quarter of U.S. trade and investment and almost half of the world's population. There is some uncertainty over whether the new Obama Administration will maintain the current momentum in improving U.S.-India ties. Mr. Obama's statements during last year's presidential campaign linking the resolution of the Kashmir conflict to the stabilization of Afghanistan have raised concerns in New Delhi that the new Administration might revert back to policies that view India narrowly through the South Asia prism rather than as the emerging global power it has become. Indian concerns were somewhat assuaged by the late-January announcement that Richard Holbrooke, special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan, would focus on those two countries, not on India or Jammu and Kashmir.

3. US-India relations are key to stability
Bajpai, teaches at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, in New Delhi, 2001(Kanti, “Add five 'E's to make a partnership,” Washington Quarterly, Summer)
An Indian-U.S. partnership would be a force for stability in world politics. Global stability will depend on peace and cooperation in Asia and a growing net of constructive interactions among the major powers of this superregion. The United States is the linchpin here. India, on the other hand, is an emerging power with capabilities that extend to the Asia-Pacific region. Both countries have vital interests in Asia, from the Persian Gulf to East Asia and throughout the Indian Ocean. These common interests relate to oil supplies, proliferation, ethnic disaffection, fundamentalism, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, freedom of the seas, safety of sea lanes, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, and a balance of power. A full-fledged strategic partnership between the United States and India, however, is some time away. In the interim, New Delhi and Washington must build understanding, links, and a foundation of military and nonmilitary cooperation that will move them toward deeper engagement. As the more powerful country, the United States, ideally, would initiate this more thoroughgoing relationship. Over the last few years, the United States has created the basis for a long-term partnership between the two countries. President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000 and the Indian prime minister's return visit to the United States in September dramatized the new relationship. The Bush administration has the opportunity in five issue areas to go beyond mere visits: a strategic entente; economics; energy; ecology; and epidemics. The "vision statement" signed in New Delhi in March 2000 and affirmed in September conceives of an architecture built largely around these five "E"s.[ 1] The United States should now boldly do what no administration has done previously with India and put real bricks and mortar into the relationship.

4. Pakistan-India conflict leads to extinction
Fai 2001 (Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council, “The most dangerous place,”7-8, lexis)
The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thorough reds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated and inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention.
US-India relations key to worldwide democracy
Mohammed Ayoob; Distinguished Professor of International Relations at MSU; 2000 (Washington Quarterly, Winter, p. proquest)
Furthermore, the recent emphasis in U.S. rhetoric on creation of a “democratic community of states,” itself based on a popularized version of the “democratic peace” thesis, can be expected to aid in improving Indian-U.S. relations. The two states crucial to legitimizing the idea of a global democratic community are obviously the world's largest democracy (India) and the world's most powerful democracy (the United States), and their partnership is essential for the idea to be taken seriously. If democracy and human rights are to inform U.S. foreign policy making in any substantial fashion in the coming decade, Washington's relations with New Delhi must inevitably move to a higher plane of understanding and cooperation.

Case - ILAW

1.The logic behind federal incorporation of CIL ignores that other states inevitably act in their self interest
Abebe, Bigelow Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School, 2007 (Daniel Abebe, Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School , “Article: Not Just Doctrine: The True Motivation For Federal Incorporation And International Human Rights Litigation,” 29 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, Lexis)
The logic of federal incorporation of customary international law (CIL) and international human rights litigation in United States courts under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) implicitly relies on a universalist theory of international law. According to this view, international law has an exogenous effect on state behavior. States do not comply with international law out of pure self-interest; rather, States comply with international law out of legal or moral obligation. Based on this assumption, universalists naturally promote the development of a global judicial system, the greater integration of international law into domestic legal [*4] regimes, and the use of international law to improve human rights practices around the world. The federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S. courts are extensions of the universalist project. This Article challenges the universalist theory of international law upon which federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation rely. It unpacks the international relations (IR) theory paradigms that support the universalist theory, and discusses a competing theory that views state compliance with international law as a function of national self-interest. Working from this perspective, it proposes a framework to evaluate the wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and the wisdom of international human rights litigation. The framework suggests that federal incorporation of CIL generates sovereignty costs for the United States, and that international human rights litigation complicates the achievement of the United States' normative and strategic foreign policy interests. The Article also shows that the universalist theory of international law is often in tension with actual state behavior in international politics. The universalist theory draws from IR theories that focus on the role of regime type, institutions, and social norms in understanding international politics. Democratic peace theory, institutionalism, and social constructivism each implicitly assume that international law has the capacity to affect state behavior. According to these IR theories, international law can encourage respect for legal norms, limit the return to material power in international politics, and operate as an instrument of progressive change. The wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation depends on the explanatory power of IR theories and the strength of the universalist theory as the appropriate conception of international law. Despite the clear attraction of these normative goals, the universalist theory relies on IR theories that often fail to recognize some of the constraints under which the United States operates in international politics. For example, although democratic peace theory and social constructivism may explain some state behavior in international politics, the United States also pursues its foreign policy goals in an international system constituted by States sensitive to the distribution of material power, concerned with issues of national security, suspicious of international law, and often motivated by national self-interest. In other words, realism also explains some state behavior in international politics. This reality naturally produces a tension between the assumptions motivating the universalist theory and the actual behavior of States. By viewing federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S. [*5] courts solely through a universalist lens, one misses their potential costs for the United States. Examining federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation from a non-universalist perspective contributes to the discussion about the proper role of international law in the American legal system. The United States' relationship with international law is largely based on national self-interest, evolving with the United States' relative position and strategic goals in international politics. Working from a non-universalist perspective, this Article connects a plausible IR theory of state behavior in international politics with a theory of state compliance with international law to evaluate the consequences of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. n1

2. Isreal disregards ILAW- Turkish activist killing proves
Khaleej Times 7/13 (7/13/10, " Another sham Israeli probe ", http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/editorial/2010/July/editorial_July25.xml&section=editorial&col=)
But then what's new? We have been here before. Rather, it would have been a shock if the Israeli investigation had condemned and initiated action against those responsible for the murder of the Turkish peace activists. At least, that would have helped Tel Aviv in redressing its crimes. Israel sticks to its policy of total defiance and violence no matter what the world thinks. It has rejected the call for a UN investigation into the incident that has earned it worldwide condemnation. But whatever Israel is trying to hide has been exposed by its own policies that are nothing but a blatant disregard of international law. Earlier, it was Palestinians who were massacred for defying Israel. But now even those who seek to help Palestinians are are inviting its wrath. The shocking killing of American peace activist and student Rachel Corrie and Turkish aid workers are a case in point.
What is surprising is how successive Israeli governments have abandoned common sense and logic in pursuing a policy that is sooner or later going to leave them universally isolated. Israel's military and economic might make it feel invincible as does its powerful friends in Washington and US media but it may only be a short lived phase. Already the tables are turning on Tel Aviv. Not only has it lost the friendship of a strategic ally, Turkey, the sentiment in Europe has also begun to turn against Israel. It's in Israel's own interest to reflect on its rapidly deteriorating standing in the international community. It is now viewed as a brutal repressive state with no regard for human rights and international law and one that has zero credibility. And this is not just an Arab or Muslim perspective where any peace talks with Israel are viewed with scepticism, given Tel Aviv's past record.
3 Turn – Incorporation of I LAW leads to backlash on US treaty obligations
Jack Goldsmith Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2K (“Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?” 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 327) Lexis
A final problem with claims that the US non-incorporation practice harms the international human rights movement is that it ignores the ex ante effect of the criticism. The United States has a long, deeply felt tradition of resisting international entanglements. Since World War II, human rights treaties have been a special cause for concern, for they strike at the heart of domestic self-governance. Opposition to ratifying these treaties was overcome only recently, and only because of the conditions to ratification that precluded these treaties from having domestic force. These conditions have for many years enjoyed the broad support of Democrats and Republicans alike in both the executive branch and the Senate. If the US treatymakers' only option were to consent to all ICCPR provisions and incorporate them fully into the domestic realm, there is no doubt that they would reject this option. The only feasible alternative to ratification on condition of non-incorporation is no ratification whatsoever. It is hard to see how the failure to ratify the human rights treaties--the only viable option to the present approach--would help the international human rights movement.

4. I-LAW is resilient – multiple factors support integration of international human rights law into practice
Douglass Cassel, Dir of the Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern U School of Law, 2001 (“International Human Rights Law In Practice: Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?” 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 121) Lexis
As one strand in the rope that pulls rights forward, the value of international human rights law depends mainly on its interaction with the other strands. The central strand in the rope is the global growth in human rights consciousness. This in turn interweaves the concept of rights, as entitlements of individuals or groups on which claims or demands may be based, together with the notion that some rights are so fundamental they are inherent birthrights of all human beings, regardless of nationality or culture. Other strands of the rope include non-governmental human rights organizations, whose numbers, activities, and sophistication in international human rights law norms and institutions have grown dramatically at both national and international levels 14 and rapidly evolving communications and transportation technology that makes possible far more effective transnational organizing by these human rights groups than was possible only two decades ago. Both communications and faster and lower cost transportation technology, by making possible frequent, well attended international conferences, have contributed to the growth of another strand in the rights revolution, transnational issue networks, 15 energized by "epistemic communities" of like-minded rights advocates in nongovernmental groups, sympathetic governments, academia, and the media, who work together across national and professional boundaries to promote shared values and agendas. 16 Some remaining strands include domestic constitutions and laws, which increasingly incorporate international norms, 17 national human rights institutions, established in dozens of countries in the last fifteen years, spreading democratization, 18 and gradually extended rule of law. This list is not all-inclusive but merely points out [*126] some of the strands comprising this "rope." The purpose here is to recognize how international human rights law interweaves with these other strands, all growing both independently and in their relations with each other, to create an ever stronger rope that pulls international human rights forward. Other strands in the rope include the growing levels of affluence and education in most parts of the world, 19 expansion in the number and reach of nonbinding international norms, 20 and, of course, the explosive growth of international human rights law itself.
5. US incorporation is irrelevant – binding international norms fail
Jack Goldsmith Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2K (“Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?” 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 327) Lexis
Many nonetheless believe that the United States' failure to domesticate human rights treaties diminishes the legitimacy of international human rights law and makes it less likely that other nations will comply with this law. This position reflects an inappropriately law-centered conception of human rights progress. Nations that increase protection for their citizens' human rights rarely do so because of the pull of international law. Europe appears to be, but is not, a counterexample. As Andrew Moravcsik has shown, the successful European human rights system was made possible by a "prior convergence of domestic practices and institutions" in support of democracy and human rights. 32 The European system provided the monitoring, information, and focal points that assisted domestic governments and groups already committed to human rights protections but unable to provide these rights through domestic institutions. 33 The European system contrasts with the international human rights regime in Latin America, which, though legally similar, has been relatively unsuccessful because it has little support from domestic groups there. 34 The inadequacy of a legalistic approach to human rights progress can be seen in another way. The two most influential human rights instruments this century--the Universal Declaration and the Helsinki Accords--were not legally binding documents. These instruments succeeded because their ideas, in combination with other world events, aroused domestic groups, helped them to organize, and incited them to action. Their technical status as non-legal documents mattered little to these ends. Similarly, neither the act of nor the success of human rights shaming strategies depend on the legal status of moral norms. China was criticized for its human rights abuses long before it signed the ICCPR. The United States was shamed before the world by its race discrimination practices in the 1950s and 1960s long before there was an international law prohibition against such discrimination. When nations criticize the United States for its juvenile death penalty, it matters not a bit that there is no [*338] international rule binding on the United States that prohibits this practice. Of course, rhetoric of illegality is often--and often irresponsibly--used in criticizing human rights practices. But it is the moral quality of the act, and not its legal validity, that provokes such criticisms. When shaming works, it is the perceived moral quality of the shamed practice, and not its illegality, that matters.
6. Multiple alternative causalities to low US I Law credibility
a. non-ratification of multiple treaties
Philip C. Aka, Professor of Political Science, Chicago State University; Vice Chair, American Bar Association Committee on International Human Rights, 2006 (“Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights” 39 Akron L. Rev. 417)Lexis
Reference to the United States's approach to human rights has an ironic ring given "the pervasive notion" in America "that there was something un-American and communistic about human rights." But the U.S. still has an approach to human rights even where, as this Article argues, that approach is incomprehensive. The traditional view in the U.S. approach to human rights holds that America recognizes and guarantees only political-civil rights to the exclusion and relegation of socioeconomic human rights and the rights of peoples, which the U.S. does not promote. Numerous indicators attend this orientation with consequences for governmental pursuit or promotion of human rights. One was the tendency, known as "exceptionalism," wherein the U.S. preaches support for the rule of law in international affairs that it refuses to adhere to domestically. 102 Related to "exceptionalism" is the propensity of the U.S. government not to ratify international human rights treaties or to reluctantly ratify them many years after they have gone into force or to ratify subject to numerous "reservations, understandings, or declarations" (RUDs). The U.S. ratified the Genocide Convention only in 1987, a dubious-record thirty-six years after the treaty's adoption in 1951; the ICCPR only in 1992, as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 103 and the ICERD both in 1994. The U.S. has yet to ratify the CEDAW, the CRC, and the ICESCR. America shares the dubious honor with Somalia as the two countries in the world that have yet to ratify the CRC. 104 The U.S. government also does not permit individual complaints under the ICCPR. 105 Appending RUDs to the U.S. Senate's consent to a treaty can greatly limit the impact of the ratified treaties on U.S. law. Unfortunately, that can be their only purpose, as one analyst laments in a special collection focusing on U.S. human rights. 106 These RUDs became so restrictive at one point that the Netherlands lodged a complaint against the U.S. government, justifiably remonstrating that the RUDs are incompatible with the basic purposes of treaties which require nations to align their domestic law with the terms of the affected treaties. 107 Not only did the U.S. government refuse to ratify treaties, in general it displayed a disinclination to support the very international institutions America helped found after World War II and an unwillingness to support new popular initiatives in international law. 108

b. Domestic culture and reporting practices
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, 2K (“The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties” 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 347) Lexis
One other way that US citizens might have invoked their treaty rights would have been by appealing to one of the United Nations ("UN") review committees established by many human rights treaties. For example, the ICCPR creates the Human Rights Committee--a group of independent experts elected by the states party to the Covenant with the responsibility, among others, of hearing complaints brought by people who believe their treaty rights have been violated. However, complaints can be heard only against governments that have ratified the (first) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which the US government has not done. Nor has it consented to have individual complaints of rights violations heard by any of the other treaty bodies. Another possible way to give meaning to the ratification of human rights treaties is to take seriously the periodic self-assessment--a report to the relevant treaty body of experts--that is required of all participating states. But the US government has treated these reports as little more than an opportunity for self-congratulation. Its first report under the ICCPR, in July 1994, was a lengthy review of relevant US laws with minimal reference to actual practices. Its first report under the Torture Convention, in October 1999, was only slightly better. As of May 2000, the US government is five years overdue in submitting what may be its most sensitive report--its first report under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 8

c. Economic rights-
Philip C. Aka, Professor of Political Science, Chicago State University; Vice Chair, American Bar Association Committee on International Human Rights, 2006 (“Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human Rights” 39 Akron L. Rev. 417)Lexis
Another area in which application of international standards will greatly benefit the American human rights approach is the protection and promotion of socioeconomic rights. America needs to extend to socioeconomic human rights and collective rights the same primacy it affords to and accords political-civil rights. The introduction summarized the eloquent arguments, going back to the days of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., including the positions of Professors Henkin and Sunstein, for the U.S. to protect and promote socioeconomic human rights and as well contended that the hurricane Katrina, which, in its wake, left a trail of death and destruction in New Orleans and other communities in the gulf region, reinforces the necessity that should have been long obvious to all for socioeconomic human rights. There are, however, some points in these legal scholars' commentaries, which, in the light of the argument made in this Article, are unavailing. One such point is Professor Henkin's statement relating to legislation of socioeconomic rights as entitlements. The position is inconsistent with the merits of the human rights framework set forth in Part II and elaborated further here. Legislating socioeconomic rights as entitlements would serve to immunize the U.S. from international human rights standards, a factor contributing to the relegation that has taken place with respect to socioeconomic rights in the U.S. human rights approach. Henkin stressed the imperativeness of U.S. support for the Universal Declaration (and the idea of universal human rights the document embodies) at a time the document has come under attack by advocates of "cultural relativism" and state "sovereignty." 208 America "should, on every occasion and by every means, reaffirm its identification with the Declaration and its ideology, with its contents, its universality, its fundamental commitment to human dignity." 209 The most effective way to provide that support is to embrace international standards. Legislating rights as entitlements, as Henkin suggests, falls below and lags behind international standards. Political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights are interlinked and inseparable. The Universal Declaration "at the very start of the human rights movement, included both categories without" separating or prioritizing them. 210 Also, the Preamble to the ICESCR, in terms mirroring those used in the ICCPR, states, "in accordance with the Universal Declaration, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights." 211 Notice the reference to freedom from fear and want; the expression calls to mind President [*455] Roosevelt's "four freedoms" speech in 1941. 212

6. I Law Fails – no resources for enforcement
Madeline Morris Prof Law, Duke U School of Law, 2K (“Few Reservations About Reservations” 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 341) Lexis
In the United States, democratic processes have thus far precluded adherence to some aspects of the ICCPR and some other human rights treaty provisions. Other states may confront other circumstances that preclude their undertaking or fulfilling some provisions of the ICCPR and other human rights treaties. For instance, states that are emerging from violent conflicts involving widespread war crimes or crimes against humanity may need to place reservations on the human rights treaties to which they accede and, equally likely, may confront serious dilemmas in attempting to implement even rather major precepts of the human rights treaties to which they are already parties. The relevant treaties may arguably entail obligations to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. 15 But such states (particularly new or transitional regimes) may be unable to conduct such prosecutions without the risk of civil war or something closely resembling it. 16 These states also may have problems providing adequate due process at trial if they do conduct prosecutions and may have problems providing adequate conditions of incarceration for such sentences as may be imposed. 17 The options available to states under these circumstances will include formal or de facto amnesties, prosecutions that fall below international human rights standards, or some combination of the two. Any such choices may run afoul of some provisions of human rights treaties to which the state is a party or would like to become a party. In such post-conflict situations, full adherence to and compliance with all human rights treaty provisions may be precluded as a result of internally disrupted governmental systems. By contrast, in the United States (and some other states), full adherence to all human rights treaty provisions may be precluded precisely as a result of internally functioning governmental systems. For very different reasons in the two sorts of cases, compliance with the full set of human rights norms proposed in the ICCPR will not be forthcoming. There is also, no doubt, a third sort of case, in which adherence to or compliance with human rights obligations--even the very core human rights obligations--is not forthcoming because of internally nefarious governmental systems.

US-Pakistan Relations

1. US Pak relations will remain high
WSJ 7/27 (Tom Wright, Siobhan Gorman, 7/27/10, " US Says Pakistan Ties Have Strengthened ", http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703292704575392981512066138.html)
But U.S. officials contend that in the past several months, Pakistan's stance has become much more nuanced than portrayed in the WikiLeaks reports, released Sunday by the document-publishing website. U.S. officials argue that the two nations have made strides in deepening military and civilian ties, chiefly in response to a Pakistani military offensive begun almost two years ago against Taliban militants operating on Pakistani soil. In return, the U.S. has pledged billions of dollars in new military and civilian aid. "We have made progress in moving this relationship forward," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Monday. "What the Pakistanis have found is that the extremists that once enjoyed complete safe haven in parts of their country now threaten their country." he Pakistani military responded with a military offensive that has pushed the militants back to a few areas of the tribal regions. The military cites more than 2,000 casualties so far as a mark of its seriousness in going after militants. The U.S. has supported this campaign with drone missile strikes, which have killed scores of top Taliban leaders.
In response, the Obama administration has also upgraded military and civilian government ties.
The U.S. Congress agreed in October to a $7.5 billion civilian aid package for Pakistan over the next five years. In March, ministers from both governments attended a high-level meeting in Washington aimed at building closer ties. U.S. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who commanded North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan until last month, visited his Pakistani counterpart, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, every three weeks and touted their good relations as being a meaningful breakthrough in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
"In the last year, we significantly ramped up consultations," said Rick Snelsire, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad.
2. Drones help stability-prevent taliban
WSJ 7/26 (7/26/10, " The AfPak Papers ", http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703700904575391142863583852.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)
Then again, we also know that Pakistan has shifted its behavior in a more pro-American direction in the last 14 months as the Taliban began to threaten Pakistan's own stability. Responding to a surge of terrorism against Pakistani targets, the Pakistani army has pushed Islamist insurgents from the Swat Valley and even South Waziristan. It has taken heavy casualties in the process. Islamabad now actively aids U.S. drone strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in the mountains along its Afghan border.
Pakistan can and should do more to pursue the terrorist enclaves along the border, as well as in Quetta and Karachi. The question is what's the best way to persuade their leaders to act. U.S.-Pakistan cooperation has been one of the Obama Administration's foreign policy successes, and it would be a tragedy if the leak of selective documents, often out of context, would now poison that cooperation.
Pakistan's military elites already see evidence of weak American will in President Obama's declared desire to start a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan next summer. While parts of the ISI are fighting on the wrong side, the U.S. needs to stay engaged with Islamabad both to bring more stability to Afghanistan and especially to destroy terrorist sanctuaries that remain a threat to the U.S. mainland.
INDO PAK WAR-
2. Turn-Indo-Pak war would devastate Pakistan—solves global terrorism and Afghanistan instability without escalation
Frontier India, 2008
(“A war in Indian Sub Continent can be good for controlling global jihad,” Dec 24 http://frontierindia.net/a-war-in-indian-sub-continent-can-be-good-for-controlling-global-jihad) vkoneru
Both the Pakistani Army and the Jihadi organisations like Tehrik-e-Taliban & Jamaat-ud-Dawa have confirmed that they will participate in a war against India. Statistically we are looking at more than 70% of worlds Jihadist and their Pakistani Army supporters. Al Quieda will not miss the opportunity to participate in such a mega event. In the words of a chief terrorist of the outlawed Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Baitullah Mehsud “time had come to wage a real jihad they had been waiting for” as per the report of The news from Pakistan. This is an opportunity that has not to be missed by the countries engaged on war on terror. A war would benefit the US/NATO, Afghanistan and India who suffer the brunt of Pakistan backed terrorist. Primarily, this brings all terrorist elements on single platform, which, would have been otherwise elusive. US is paying an estimated Pakistan almost one billion dollar a year to kill these terrorists and it bears no result. It will also represent an opportunity for US to wrest control of the Islamic Nuclear weapon for global good. For Afghanistan, it will be an opportunity to cross the line of control and hit targets of opportunity deep inside Pakistani terrorist breeding grounds. For Indian terrorism problem, a strike on Pakistan will be the best option. Historically, India has missed the opportunity of dismembering Pakistan and dismantling its terrorist structure due to world pressure. The world opinion is favorable as now they themselves are suffering from the international migraine called Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy is at its lowest and its military apparatus is very old. Even though the terrorist have declared that they will participate in fighting, there are areas in Pakistan which would like to gain freedom. Breaking up Pakistan and dismantling its terror structure will greatly reduce the world terror problem. Like minded allies like India, US, Afghanistan and Israel should jointly execute this program.


2. No offense—Pakistan gets crushed—
PTI, 2009
(Press Trust of India, “India should launch all out war to finish off Pak: Togadia,” Jan 20) vkoneru
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad today alleged that the Centre's diplomatic efforts against Pakistan had been a"complete failure" and advocated an"all out war" which would"finish off the Islamic, jihadi terrorist state". " India should go for an all out war against Pakistan, an Islamic, jihadi terrorist state, the survival of which has become a threat for the entire world,"VHP's international secretary general Praveen Togadia told media here on the sidelines of a function organised by the saffron outfit. "It may be done with the help of powers like Israel and Europe and the aim should be the extinction of the Pakistani state itself, whatever may be the cost in terms of expenditure and loss of human lives,"he added. He said the Government's diplomatic efforts following Mumbai attacks have been a"complete failure" as Pakistan"continues to hoodwink us as well as the international community by making contradictory statements". Terming New Delhi's criticism of the Israeli attacks in Gaza a"blunder", he said the Jewish state "could be an important ally in the war against terror and to win its confidence, we must empathise with its concerns over its own national security". The VHP leader claimed that Europe and the anti- Taliban regime in Afghanistan"would support India in its war against Pakistan if we make a sincere effort in that direction".

Robo war-

1. E

2.Drone usage decreeing in the squo
John Keller, Staff writer @ Military and Aerospace, NO DATE GIVEN, “DOD to cut unmanned aerial vehicle procurement by one third over next decade” http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/article-display/347895/articles/military-aerospace-electronics/volume-19/issue-12/news/news/dod-to-cut-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-procurement-by-one-third-over-next-decade.html
ARLINGTON, Va.–The early years of the 21st century have seen explosive growth in U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) purchases of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), but DOD is expected to cut UAV procurement by one-third over the next decade, predict defense industry analysts who are members of the Government Electronics Industry Association (GEIA) segment of the Information Technology Association of America in Arlington, Va.
Pentagon UAV buys should decrease from $3.5 billion in 2009 to $2.6 billion in 2019, GEIA analysts say. This represents a decade-long reduction of 34.6 percent–or a combined annual reduction rate of 3 percent.
3.No air rev- too expensive and DOD spending increasing elsewhere
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS and also acts as a national security analyst for ABC News. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Alreigh Burke,an admiral of the United States Navy who distinguished himself during World War II and the Korean War, and who served as Chief of Naval Operations during the Eisenhower administration, Hans Kaeser, ,intelligence Analyst at Deutsche Bank, December ’08 “America’s Self destroying airpower” **http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081001_aircraft_modernstudy.pdf**
Almost every major aircraft development program is in so much trouble that the replacements are stuck in a morass of procurement and development problems, cost explosions, and rifts within the Department of Defense. Fifth-generation tactical aircraft are affected by significant delays and cost increases.
The F-22 has almost tripled in unit cost. Meanwhile, the planned procurement quantity has been reduced from 750 to 183. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter faces a similar fate, and may not be ready in time to replace aging legacy fighters, creating a ―fighter gap‖ in the Air Force‘s and Navy‘s inventories. The strategic capabilities are not less affected by these problems.
A new bomber is planned, as the previous B-2B program escalated in cost by a factor of at least 300 percent, and was reduced to roughly one fifth of its original force goal. Finally, a program to replace the almost 50-year old air refueling tanker is stuck in a political tug of war caused by the Air Force‘s mismanagement of the program. Meanwhile, maintenance costs to keep the legacy fleet operational are increasing rapidly.
There now are fewer program alternatives if any key program runs into trouble, failed methods of cost analysis are still in play without adequate cost-risk analysis or use of regression analysis.The pressure to ―sell‖ programs by understating cost and risk have all combined to push air modernization to the crisis point. Current plans for aircraft modernization are not affordable unless aircraft costs are sharply reduced, deliveries are delayed years longer than planned, or funding shifts to lower cost variants or upgrades of older types. The only alternative is a major increase in real defense spending. This report examines how these problems affect the tactical, strategic, and enabling capabilities of US air power. It draws on recent government data and news reports to reveal the state of current strategic air power and identify the challenges the next administration will face for future force planning and budgeting.

T- Military presence

1. Presence consists of infrastructure, troops and agreements and exercises conducted with the host country but excludes weapons systems like UAVs.
J.E. Peterson, Ph.D. Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Middle East Institute, an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and more. 2008. “Foreign Military Presence and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword.” Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. pp. 183-205. <http://www.jepeterson.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Foreign_Military_Presence_in_the_Gulf.pdf>
Table 7.2 Levels of Foreign Military Presence
o : present in the Gulf
x : not present in the Gulf
? : uncertain if present in the Gulf
1. intervention and occupation"
2. proximate expeditionary force in region - power projection
3. bases and other permanent installations (ranging from full bases, with the FMP enjoying internal sovereignty, to small support functions, such as naval replenishment or technical facilities)
4. non-permanent deployed units
5. joint or multilateral exercises
6. pre-positioning and access agreements
7. offshore naval presence
8. "offshore" ready deployment capability (e.g. from neighboring countries or regions)
9. mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO, NATO, SEATO)
10. arms and equipment transfers
11. "technical" facilities (intelligence, space, communications)
12. aircraft over-flights (generally unseen and uncontroversial but reverses on occasion of aircraft trouble or in time of conflict or crisis)
13. surrogate forces (support for revolutionary or irredentist movements; Cuba in Africa


2. The Plan only reduces the presence of drones in afghanistan, not America’s military presence


3. Vote neg-

a) Limits- We still give them every aff that’s at the core of the topic like reducing troop based intervention in the middle and far-east, but limit out the THOUSANDS of weapons systems that we could never prepare for and would prevent us from learning about the core issues of the topic.
b) Most Contextual, our def is written by a PhD talking specifically about our military presence in the Middle East.

FEM K

1. International Relations excludes feminine perspectives in its descriptions of global politics
Darryl Jarvis, Ph.D in IR from University of British Columbia, 2000, “International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline,” p. 145
The Third Debate has thus evolved a new addendum, one where gender and identity politics questions even dissident thought, labeling it an equally suspect discourse propagated largely by white middle class hetero-sexual males. This represents a new, deeper, subversive tendency in dissident scholarship, perhaps more radical and more threatening than even Ashley's. This time the charge is not just that we have been thinking wrong, or not thinking at all, but when not thinking we have been actively constructing gender gulags, excluding women by segregating and denying them access to international relations. In its most overt form practitioners are charged with being misogynist, sexist, racist, and homophobic, a disposition in theory that manifests itself in to what Steve Smith describes as pomophobia, or what V. Spike Peterson laments as the failure of feminist literature to be taken seriously in International Relations." For feminists, such a predilection represents an "androcentric system of thought inherited from early western state making[,] ... revitalized in the Enlightenment," and now cemented in international relations as a form of "masculinism" but one which is "rendered so invisible as to be absent in even critical and postmodern accounts."" International Relations thus represents a form of professionalized bigotry, evolved through the natural outgrowth of unreflective men theorists who are wedded implicitly "to an unacknowledged and seemingly commonplace principle that international relations is the proper homestead or place for people called men." Men of all political stripes have, according to Sylvester, been winking at feminists as they walk by, failing to read them, appoint them, take them seriously, or acknowledge them." In such a "chilly climate," women have been sys-tematically "evacuated" from International Relations, forced into their assigned places at home, and even when they have managed to break free of such places, "their words have been lost, or covered-up and stored in the basement, . . . ignored because they are the views of people called women and 'women' have no place in the political places of 'men.""' Of "all the institutionalized forms of contemporary social and political analysis," concludes R.B.J. Walker, International Relations is "the most gender- blind, indeed crudely patriarchal." At the center of this disciplinary bastion of male privilege and repression, feminists identify an unreflective male-body-politic, one unknowingly prone to gendered or masculinist worldviews because of their unconscious male-sexuality. Underpinning much contemporary feminist theory is an implicit assumption of innate difference between men and women, where social inequalities stem as much from the hormonal/ anatomical attributes of men as they do from social institutions like patriarchy or the thought practices associated with rational or positivist-based epistemologies. For many feminists, the litany of allegations also derive from psychoanalytic interpretation, where, for example, the arms race, strategic and military studies, comparative force assessment, military-industrial complexes, or studies of the new surveillance technologies represent a male obsession with hardware and high politics characteristic of the egocentric, aggressive, powerseeking, rational man who unconsciously transposes his phallocentric desires into war-hunting-sport-fighting-power-seeking pursuits. Using a type of neobiological cum psychosociological logic, males are seen to project a testosterone-induced aggression/violence indicative of hormonal dispositions or imprinted primeval genetic memories to protect food sources or territory, for example. Or, as the case may be, some men never mature. They continue to play with dangerous toys-motorbikes, racing cars, weapons, and war-flirting with death." For Helen Caldicott, some men simply display a fascination with killing. Why? Perhaps, she notes, "Because women know from birth that they can experience the ultimate act of creativity, whereas boys and men lack this potential capacity and replace it with a fascination with control over life and death and a feeling of creative omnipotence."" Women, on the other hand, are "allied to the lift process" by virtue of "theft hormonal constitution." "She is not afraid to admit she has made a mistake and is generally interested in life-oriented human dynamics. She innately understands the basic principles of conflict resolution."" Men, by contrast, when they make war do so for reasons of psychosexual virility, in order to demonstrate their sexual potency as aging, white, elite male decision makers. As Caldicott notes, "It is never the people who make the decision to kill who get killed. It is the boys who usually don't even know what a dispute is about, let alone understand the intricacies of international politics. [These] old men act out theft fascination with killing, theft need to prove theft toughness and sexual adequacy by using innocent pawns."" Here, male aggression is ascribed to the deeply embedded psychodramas played out in male minds, the psychosociology of the male as a competitive sex predator, for example, and the fixation with phallocentric satisfaction." Men theorists of international relations are still really boys playing with guns, tanks, and bombs, caught up in the activity of psychosexual play as they study or help prepare for, make, and fight wars. "Little boys with big toys" was the popular expression of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and of the protests by women at Greenham Common against the deployment of Pershing and Cruise miles in the United Kingdom. For Caldicott, for example, the arms race was little more than an incidence of "missile envy," a competition between male superpowers intent on projecting theft power as a phalloeentrie expression of their desire to compete and dominate. Indeed, for Caldicott, it is no accident that missiles and phalluses have a certain similarity in shape and appearance."

The affirmative cannot solve for drones – there must be a true separation between the body as a body and a body as a target. Feminists can make the distinction.
Lauren Wilcox, Political Theory Colloquium, 12-11-2009, http://www.polisci.umn.edu/centers/theory/schedule.html
While making important contributions on the relationship between war, technology, and the legitimacy of killing, this work does not challenge the status of bodies as only important in regards to how they may be killed. Like the mainstream literature, much of the critical literature on precision bombing is complicit erasure of bodies in international relations. Critical projects such as those intent on demonstrating the ‘myth’ of precision bombing are similar in some respect to the feminist project of making visible the injurious nature of war as a counter to the narrative of glorious and humane war. Like feminist projects on making bodies visible, such critical projects suffer from similar issues, that is, the treatment of bodies as biological entities to be counted, identified and shown as an example of the brutal, violent nature of war. One of the most important feminist contributions in theorizing the body is work that highlights the ways in which strategic thought in International Relations ignores and in fact, necessarily obscures the gruesome realities of war and its impact on the human body. Beyond bemoaning the existence of euphemisms such as ‘collateral damage,’ ‘daisy cutters’ and ‘acceptable losses,’ some feminists have shown how certain abstract calculations about war are made possible by the erasure of human bodily suffering. Feminists have tried to correct theories of violence and war that work to obscure the reality of bodily violence while focusing on political, strategic, and tactic maneuverings. Such theories have been criticized by feminists for their abstraction which allows theorists to distance themselves from the horrors of war. Carol Cohn, in her landmark essay, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,” (Cohn 1987) insists that this neglect of bodily harm is not an oversight, but rather is a precondition for the existence of the theory and the strategic apparatus underpinning it. The violence and destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are literally made ‘unthinkable’: they cannot be discussed within the terms of strategic discourse.
It’s not enough to add women and stir – vote negative to fundamentally alter the way we approach international relations
Laura Sjoberg, assistant prof of political science @ University of Florida, 2008, "The Norm of Tradition: Gender Subordination and Women's Exclusion in International Relations”, p. 177-178.
If what is “traditional” is endogenous, then the problem of women’s underrepresentation is structural rather than incidental. To argue that the problem is structural is to argue that adding women to the ranks of our faculties, our tenure rolls, and our journals is insufficient to redress women’s subordination. Even if women were numerically “equal” to men in terms of their participation and rank in the profession, they would still be participating in a men’s world. Nancy Hirschmann explains that “one cannot merely add women’s experience to the dominant discourse because the two utilize different ontological and epistemological frameworks” (1989, 1242). Maybe women’s experiences in life also color their preference for nonmainstream theories. I am not saying that there is one “woman’s perspective” or that all women necessarily have something in common (except, perhaps, some experience of gender subordination). But gender subordination is rampant throughout the world and even in the United States. J. Ann Tickner argues that women’s marginality in life helps them to see women’s marginality specifically and political marginality more generally in scholarship. This argument would help explain the difference of chosen areas of study. The argument is essentially that subordination alters perspective (Pettman 1996; Tickner 2001). Catharine MacKinnon argues that differences between women and men in task, perspective, and even physicality are the result of gender subordination rather than its cause, because subordinated people have different tasks and see the world differently (MacKinnon 1989). The incompleteness of gender subordination accounts for the exceptions, while the fact of gender subordination accounts for the norm. Spike Peterson argues that “the femininity and masculinity that inform our identification as women and men have pervasive implications for the lives we lead and the world(s) in which we live” (1999, 37).

Politics

START will pass, but Obama’s capital is key
The Hill, 7-23-10, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/110549-kerry-confident-senate-will-ratify-start-this-year
The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed confidence Friday that the upper chamber will ratify a key nuclear arms treaty with Russia before the year is up. Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) acknowledged Republicans concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that the Obama administration hoped would pass quickly after it was signed three months ago. But Kerry assured that it would pass before the new year. In an interview with Bloomberg News to air this weekend, the Massachusetts senator was asked if the Senate could ratify the treaty before the November midterm elections. "I don’t want to get into the odds-making on it," he replied. "What is important is the Senate will pass it." Pressed on whether the Senate would vote this year, Kerry replied, "I believe we will pass it this year." START has been put on the backburner in the midst of a hectic Senate schedule as the August recess approaches and with election-year politics at play. But President Obama has made it clear that passing the treaty is a priority, especially in light of his effort to "reset" the U.S.'s diplomatic relationship with Russia. The vote, however, appears to be a heavy lift. It takes 67 senators to ratify a treaty, meaning that all Democrats plus eight Republicans would need to support it. But aside from Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), no other GOP senators back the treaty.
Withdrawal’s massively unpopular – Republicans will take advantage of the flip-flop.
Biddle 2009 [Stephen, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow for Defense Policy, “Is It Worth It? The Difficult Case for War in Afghanistan” July-August, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=617]
However, reversing policy and disengaging would be no easier for Obama. It would be the wrong course on the merits. Politically, it would commit the Administration to a policy now supported by only 17 percent of the electorate. It would play into the traditional Republican narrative of Democratic weakness on defense, facilitate widespread if ill-founded Republican accusations of the Administration’s leftist radicalism, and risk alienating moderate Democrats in battleground districts whose support the President will need on other issues. However bad the news may look if the United States fights on, withdrawal would probably mean a Karzai collapse and a Taliban victory, an outcome that would flood American TV screens with nightmarish imagery.
START key to prevent nuclear war
Blanchfield 9
Mike Blanchfield, staff writer, 7-4-2009. [Montreal Gazette, “Duck and cover or a world without nukes?” http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html?id=1759991&sponsor=]
Still, Blair and many others say the need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not only the ever-present Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, said Russian and U.S. co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a much broader sense. "For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a semi-hostile relationship," Graham said. "There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation. Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1,500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. "We've pushed our luck as far as we can; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said.